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134 lines
6.5 KiB
ReStructuredText
Abstract
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========
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This document outlines a proposed format for human-readable IDs within Matrix.
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For status see https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3/files
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Background
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----------
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UTF-8 is the dominant character encoding for Unicode on the web. However,
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using Unicode as the character set for human-readable IDs is troublesome. There
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are many different characters which appear identical to each other, but would
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produce different IDs. In addition, there are non-printable characters which
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cannot be rendered by the end-user. This creates an opportunity for
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phishing/spoofing of IDs, commonly known as a homograph attack.
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Web browsers encountered this problem when International Domain Names were
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introduced. A variety of checks were put in place in order to protect users. If
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an address failed the check, the raw punycode would be displayed to
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disambiguate the address.
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The human-readable IDs in Matrix are Room Aliases and User IDs.
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Room aliases look like ``#localpart:domain``. These aliases point to opaque
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non human-readable room IDs. These pointers can change to point at a different
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room ID at any time. User IDs look like ``@localpart:domain``. These represent
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actual end-users (there is no indirection).
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Proposal
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========
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User IDs and Room Aliases MUST be Unicode as UTF-8. Checks are performed on
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these IDs by homeservers to protect users from phishing/spoofing attacks.
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These checks are:
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User ID Localparts:
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- MUST NOT contain a ``:`` or start with a ``@`` or ``.``
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- MUST NOT contain one of the 107 blacklisted characters on this list:
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http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.IDN.blacklist_chars
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- After stripping " 0-9, +, -, [, ], _, and the space character it MUST NOT
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contain characters from >1 language, defined by the `exemplar characters`_
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on http://cldr.unicode.org/
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.. _exemplar characters: http://cldr.unicode.org/translation/characters#TOC-Exemplar-Characters
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Room Alias Localparts:
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- MUST NOT contain a ``:``
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- MUST NOT contain one of the 107 blacklisted characters on this list:
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http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.IDN.blacklist_chars
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- After stripping " 0-9, +, -, [, ], _, and the space character it MUST NOT
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contain characters from >1 language, defined by the `exemplar characters`_
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on http://cldr.unicode.org/
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.. _exemplar characters: http://cldr.unicode.org/translation/characters#TOC-Exemplar-Characters
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In the event of a failed user ID check, well behaved homeservers MUST:
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- Rewrite user IDs in the offending events to be punycode with an additional ``@``
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prefix **before** delivering them to clients. There are no guarantees for
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consistency between homeserver ID checking implementations. As a result, user
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IDs MUST be sent in their *original* form over federation. This can be done in
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a stateless manner as the punycode form has no information loss.
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In the event of a failed room alias check, well behaved homeservers MUST:
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- Send an HTTP status code 400 with an ``errcode`` of ``M_FAILED_HUMAN_ID_CHECK``
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to the client if the client is attempting to *create* this alias.
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- Send an HTTP status code 400 with an ``errcode`` of ``M_FAILED_HUMAN_ID_CHECK``
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to the client if the client is attempting to *join* a room via this alias.
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Examples::
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@ebаy:example.org (Cyrillic 'a', everything else English)
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@@xn--eby-7cd:example.org (Punycode with additional '@')
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Homeservers SHOULD NOT allow two user IDs that differ only by case. This
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SHOULD be applied based on the capitalisation rules in the CLDR dataset:
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http://cldr.unicode.org/
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This check SHOULD be applied when the user ID is created, in order to prevent
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registration with the same name and different capitalisations, e.g.
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``@foo:bar`` vs ``@Foo:bar`` vs ``@FOO:bar``. Homeservers MAY canonicalise
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the user ID to be completely lower-case if desired.
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Rationale
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=========
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Each ID is split into segments (localpart/domain) around the ``:``. For
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this reason, ``:`` is a reserved character and cannot be a localpart character.
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The 107 blacklisted characters are used to prevent non-printable characters and
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spaces from being used. The decision to ban characters from more than 1 language
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matches the behaviour of `Google Chrome for IDN handling`_. This is to protect
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against common homograph attacks such as ebаy.com (Cyrillic "a", rest is
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English). This would always result in a failed check. Even with this though
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there are limitations. For example, сахар is entirely Cyrillic, whereas caxap is
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entirely Latin.
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.. _Google Chrome for IDN handling: https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/idn-in-google-chrome
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User ID localparts cannot start with ``@`` so that a namespace of localparts
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beginning with ``@`` can be created. This namespace is used for user IDs which
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fail the ID checks. A failed ID could look like ``@@xn--c1yn36f:example.org``.
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If a user ID fails the check, the user ID on the event is renamed. This doesn't
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require extra work for clients, and users will see an odd user ID rather than a
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spoofed name. Renaming is done in order to protect users of a given HS, so if a
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malicious HS doesn't rename their IDs, it doesn't affect any other HS.
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Room aliases cannot be rewritten as punycode and sent to the HS the alias is
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referring to as the HS will not necessarily understand the rewritten alias.
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Other rejected solutions for failed checks
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------------------------------------------
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- Additional key: Informational key on the event attached by HS to say "unsafe
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ID". Problem: clients can just ignore it, and since it will appear only very
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rarely, easy to forget when implementing clients.
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- Require client handshake: Forces clients to implement
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a check, else they cannot communicate with the misleading ID. However, this
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is extra overhead in both client implementations and round-trips.
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- Reject event: Outright rejection of the ID at the point of creation /
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receiving event. Point of creation rejection is preferable to avoid the ID
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entering the system in the first place. However, malicious HSes can just
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allow the ID. Hence, other homeservers must reject them if they see them in
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events. Client never sees the problem ID, provided the HS is correctly
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implemented. However, it is difficult to ensure that ALL HSes will come to the
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same conclusion (given the CLDR dataset does come out with new versions).
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Outstanding Problems
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====================
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Capitalisation
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--------------
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The capitalisation rules outlined above are nice but do not fully resolve issues
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where ``@alice:example.com`` tries to speak with ``@bob:example.org`` using
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``@Bob:example.org``. It is up to ``example.org`` to map ``Bob`` to ``bob`` in
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a sensible way.
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