330 lines
13 KiB
Django/Jinja
330 lines
13 KiB
Django/Jinja
# distributed from ansible
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server:
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###########################################################################
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# BASIC SETTINGS
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###########################################################################
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# Time to live maximum for RRsets and messages in the cache. If the maximum
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# kicks in, responses to clients still get decrementing TTLs based on the
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# original (larger) values. When the internal TTL expires, the cache item
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# has expired. Can be set lower to force the resolver to query for data
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# often, and not trust (very large) TTL values.
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cache-max-ttl: 86400
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# Time to live minimum for RRsets and messages in the cache. If the minimum
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# kicks in, the data is cached for longer than the domain owner intended,
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# and thus less queries are made to look up the data. Zero makes sure the
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# data in the cache is as the domain owner intended, higher values,
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# especially more than an hour or so, can lead to trouble as the data in
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# the cache does not match up with the actual data any more.
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cache-min-ttl: 300
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# Set the working directory for the program.
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directory: "/opt/unbound/etc/unbound"
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# RFC 6891. Number of bytes size to advertise as the EDNS reassembly buffer
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# size. This is the value put into datagrams over UDP towards peers.
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# The actual buffer size is determined by msg-buffer-size (both for TCP and
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# UDP). Do not set higher than that value.
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# Default is 1232 which is the DNS Flag Day 2020 recommendation.
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# Setting to 512 bypasses even the most stringent path MTU problems, but
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# is seen as extreme, since the amount of TCP fallback generated is
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# excessive (probably also for this resolver, consider tuning the outgoing
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# tcp number).
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edns-buffer-size: 1232
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# Listen to for queries from clients and answer from this network interface
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# and port.
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interface: 0.0.0.0@53
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do-ip4: yes
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do-udp: yes
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do-tcp: yes
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do-ip6: yes
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prefer-ip6: no
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# Rotates RRSet order in response (the pseudo-random number is taken from
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# the query ID, for speed and thread safety).
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rrset-roundrobin: yes
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# Drop user privileges after binding the port.
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username: "_unbound"
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###########################################################################
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# LOGGING
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###########################################################################
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# print log lines to inform about local zone actions
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log-local-actions: yes
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# print one line per query to the log
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log-queries: no
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# print one line per reply to the log
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log-replies: no
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# Do not print log lines that say why queries return SERVFAIL to clients
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log-servfail: yes
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# Further limit logging
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logfile: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/log/unbound.log
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# Level 0 means no verbosity, only errors.
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# Level 1 gives operational information.
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# Level 2 gives detailed operational information.
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# Level 3 gives query level information, output per query.
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# Level 4 gives algorithm level information.
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# Level 5 logs client identification for cache misses
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verbosity: 1
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# At 0, off.
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#
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# At 1, for every user query that fails a line is printed to the
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# logs. This way you can monitor what happens with validation. Use
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# a diagnosis tool, such as dig or drill, to find out why
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# validation is failing for these queries.
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#
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# At 2, not only the query that failed is printed but also the
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# reason why unbound thought it was wrong and which server sent
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# the faulty data.
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val-log-level: 2
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log-time-ascii: no
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use-syslog: no
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###########################################################################
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# PRIVACY SETTINGS
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###########################################################################
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# RFC 8198. Use the DNSSEC NSEC chain to synthesize NXDO-MAIN and other
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# denials, using information from previous NXDO-MAINs answers. In other
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# words, use cached NSEC records to generate negative answers within a
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# range and positive answers from wildcards. This increases performance,
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# decreases latency and resource utilization on both authoritative and
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# recursive servers, and increases privacy. Also, it may help increase
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# resilience to certain DoS attacks in some circumstances.
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aggressive-nsec: yes
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# Extra delay for timeouted UDP ports before they are closed, in msec.
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# This prevents very delayed answer packets from the upstream (recursive)
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# servers from bouncing against closed ports and setting off all sort of
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# close-port counters, with eg. 1500 msec. When timeouts happen you need
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# extra sockets, it checks the ID and remote IP of packets, and unwanted
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# packets are added to the unwanted packet counter.
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delay-close: 10000
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# Prevent the unbound server from forking into the background as a daemon
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do-daemonize: no
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# Add localhost to the do-not-query-address list.
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do-not-query-localhost: no
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# Number of bytes size of the aggressive negative cache.
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neg-cache-size: 4M
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# Send minimum amount of information to upstream servers to enhance
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# privacy (best privacy).
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qname-minimisation: yes
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###########################################################################
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# SECURITY SETTINGS
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###########################################################################
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# Only give access to recursion clients from LAN IPs
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access-control: 127.0.0.1/32 allow
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access-control: 192.168.0.0/16 allow
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access-control: 172.16.0.0/12 allow
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access-control: 10.0.0.0/8 allow
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# access-control: fc00::/7 allow
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# access-control: ::1/128 allow
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# File with trust anchor for one zone, which is tracked with RFC5011
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# probes.
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auto-trust-anchor-file: "var/root.key"
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# Enable chroot (i.e, change apparent root directory for the current
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# running process and its children)
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chroot: "/opt/unbound/etc/unbound"
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# Deny queries of type ANY with an empty response.
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deny-any: yes
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# Harden against algorithm downgrade when multiple algorithms are
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# advertised in the DS record.
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harden-algo-downgrade: yes
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# RFC 8020. returns nxdomain to queries for a name below another name that
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# is already known to be nxdomain.
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harden-below-nxdomain: yes
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# Require DNSSEC data for trust-anchored zones, if such data is absent, the
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# zone becomes bogus. If turned off you run the risk of a downgrade attack
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# that disables security for a zone.
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harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
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# Only trust glue if it is within the servers authority.
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harden-glue: yes
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# Ignore very large queries.
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harden-large-queries: yes
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# Perform additional queries for infrastructure data to harden the referral
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# path. Validates the replies if trust anchors are configured and the zones
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# are signed. This enforces DNSSEC validation on nameserver NS sets and the
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# nameserver addresses that are encountered on the referral path to the
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# answer. Experimental option.
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harden-referral-path: no
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# Ignore very small EDNS buffer sizes from queries.
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harden-short-bufsize: yes
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# Refuse id.server and hostname.bind queries
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hide-identity: yes
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# Refuse version.server and version.bind queries
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hide-version: yes
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# Report this identity rather than the hostname of the server.
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identity: "DNS"
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# These private network addresses are not allowed to be returned for public
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# internet names. Any occurrence of such addresses are removed from DNS
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# answers. Additionally, the DNSSEC validator may mark the answers bogus.
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# This protects against DNS Rebinding
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#private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
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#private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
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#private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
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#private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
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# private-address: fd00::/8
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# private-address: fe80::/10
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# private-address: ::ffff:0:0/96
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# Enable ratelimiting of queries (per second) sent to nameserver for
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# performing recursion. More queries are turned away with an error
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# (servfail). This stops recursive floods (e.g., random query names), but
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# not spoofed reflection floods. Cached responses are not rate limited by
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# this setting. Experimental option.
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ratelimit: 1000
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# Use this certificate bundle for authenticating connections made to
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# outside peers (e.g., auth-zone urls, DNS over TLS connections).
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tls-cert-bundle: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
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# Set the total number of unwanted replies to eep track of in every thread.
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# When it reaches the threshold, a defensive action of clearing the rrset
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# and message caches is taken, hopefully flushing away any poison.
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# Unbound suggests a value of 10 million.
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unwanted-reply-threshold: 10000
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# Don't use Capitalization randomization as it known to cause DNSSEC issues sometimes
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# see https://discourse.pi-hole.net/t/unbound-stubby-or-dnscrypt-proxy/9378 for further details
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use-caps-for-id: no
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# Help protect users that rely on this validator for authentication from
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# potentially bad data in the additional section. Instruct the validator to
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# remove data from the additional section of secure messages that are not
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# signed properly. Messages that are insecure, bogus, indeterminate or
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# unchecked are not affected.
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val-clean-additional: yes
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###########################################################################
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# PERFORMANCE SETTINGS
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###########################################################################
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# https://nlnetlabs.nl/documentation/unbound/howto-optimise/
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# https://nlnetlabs.nl/news/2019/Feb/05/unbound-1.9.0-released/
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# Number of slabs in the infrastructure cache. Slabs reduce lock contention
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# by threads. Must be set to a power of 2.
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infra-cache-slabs: 32
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# Number of incoming TCP buffers to allocate per thread. Default
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# is 10. If set to 0, or if do-tcp is "no", no TCP queries from
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# clients are accepted. For larger installations increasing this
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# value is a good idea.
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incoming-num-tcp: 10
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# Number of slabs in the key cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
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# threads. Must be set to a power of 2. Setting (close) to the number
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# of cpus is a reasonable guess.
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key-cache-slabs: 32
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# Number of bytes size of the message cache.
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# Unbound recommendation is to Use roughly twice as much rrset cache memory
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# as you use msg cache memory.
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msg-cache-size: 4889163776
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# Number of slabs in the message cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
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# threads. Must be set to a power of 2. Setting (close) to the number of
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# cpus is a reasonable guess.
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msg-cache-slabs: 32
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# The number of queries that every thread will service simultaneously. If
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# more queries arrive that need servicing, and no queries can be jostled
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# out (see jostle-timeout), then the queries are dropped.
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# This is best set at half the number of the outgoing-range.
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# This Unbound instance was compiled with libevent so it can efficiently
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# use more than 1024 file descriptors.
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num-queries-per-thread: 4096
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# The number of threads to create to serve clients.
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# This is set dynamically at run time to effectively use available CPUs
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# resources
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num-threads: 23
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# Number of ports to open. This number of file descriptors can be opened
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# per thread.
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# This Unbound instance was compiled with libevent so it can efficiently
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# use more than 1024 file descriptors.
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outgoing-range: 8192
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# Number of bytes size of the RRset cache.
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# Use roughly twice as much rrset cache memory as msg cache memory
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rrset-cache-size: 9778327552
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# Number of slabs in the RRset cache. Slabs reduce lock contention by
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# threads. Must be set to a power of 2.
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rrset-cache-slabs: 32
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# Do no insert authority/additional sections into response messages when
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# those sections are not required. This reduces response size
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# significantly, and may avoid TCP fallback for some responses. This may
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# cause a slight speedup.
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minimal-responses: yes
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# # Fetch the DNSKEYs earlier in the validation process, when a DS record
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# is encountered. This lowers the latency of requests at the expense of
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# little more CPU usage.
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prefetch: yes
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# Fetch the DNSKEYs earlier in the validation process, when a DS record is
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# encountered. This lowers the latency of requests at the expense of little
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# more CPU usage.
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prefetch-key: yes
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# Have unbound attempt to serve old responses from cache with a TTL of 0 in
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# the response without waiting for the actual resolution to finish. The
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# actual resolution answer ends up in the cache later on.
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serve-expired: yes
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# Open dedicated listening sockets for incoming queries for each thread and
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# try to set the SO_REUSEPORT socket option on each socket. May distribute
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# incoming queries to threads more evenly.
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so-reuseport: yes
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###########################################################################
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# LOCAL ZONE
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###########################################################################
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# Include file for local-data and local-data-ptr
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include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/a-records.conf
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include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/srv-records.conf
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###########################################################################
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# FORWARD ZONE
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###########################################################################
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include: /opt/unbound/etc/unbound/forward-records.conf
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remote-control:
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control-enable: no
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